8/17/2009
National Debt History
By Harvey Powers and Martin Gremm
(c) 2009 Pivot Point Advisors
Introduction
The United States has a long history of carrying public debt, dating back to the
Revolutionary War. In fact, ever since Alexander Hamilton proclaimed “a national
debt, if not excessive, will be to us a national blessing,” the US has only been
debt-free for one year, between 1834 and 1835. Recently, the national debt has exploded,
raising concerns that our country’s budget deficits are unsustainable.
In this article we discuss the United States' public debt and the factors that contributed
to its accumulation. We then compare the US to other heavily indebted countries
such as Japan and post-World War II UK.
There are many parallels and a few differences between how the nations accumulated
their very substantial debt loads. We review how Japan and the UK dealt with their
situations and discuss the implications for the US.
United States
Deficit spending during World War II brought the ratio of total outstanding US national
debt to the US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio to 121%, its highest level in
history. The Debt to GDP ratio is a common way to measure the indebtedness of a
country relative to the size of its economy.
From the 1950s to the early 1980s, modest budget deficits increased the national
debt more slowly than inflation and productivity gains raised the GDP. As a result,
the Debt to GDP ratio declined to a post-war low of 40% in 1982 and increased to
about 60% in the late 1990s.
Over the past eight years, large deficits have become the norm as spending on the
Iraq War, entitlement programs, and financial bailouts effortlessly outpaced tax
revenues. The proposed health care reform and other new spending measures will almost
certainly add to our budget deficit and therefore to our national debt.
Neither war spending nor health care reform and bailout packages are likely to be
productive investments that will put our economy on a more solid footing. While
some of these spending measures may have been necessary, there is virtually no chance
that these investments will generate sufficient returns, either through higher future
tax revenues or profitable asset sales, to pay off the debt incurred to finance
them. We will see that this is a common theme when we look at Japan and the UK.
The most recent estimates put the Debt to GDP ratio at about 84%. This ratio is
expected to increase to 100% by 2011. The US currently spends nearly 14% of the
national budget in interest payments. Any significant debt issuance or interest
rate increase will make the interest payments the largest expense in the US budget,
surpassing military spending for the top spot.
The US currently enjoys a historically low cost of borrowing, especially for long-dated
bonds. Two broad groups buy virtually all of the US government debt and they are
willing to accept very low yields for different reasons.
The single largest buyer of Treasury Bonds is the Social Security Trust Fund, which
holds, together with other government entities, about 50% of the national debt.
The Social Security Trust Fund is willing to pay more for these bonds than other
market participants would. This is a great deal for the government, because high
bond prices translate into low interest rates, but it hurts all Social Security
participants because low interest rates entail low returns on Trust assets. A key
reason why the Trust is willing to overpay for Treasury Bonds may be that the Secretary
of the Treasury is also the chairman of the Board of Trustees.
Domestic and foreign non-government entities each hold half of the remaining 50%
of the national debt. There is still a prevailing perception that US Treasury Bonds
are the safest investment available. Private entities often buy bonds in times of
crisis, such as our current recession, which drives the prices up and the yields
down. This, together with the high prices paid by the Social Security Trust, has
kept long-term interest rates in the US near historical lows.
Japan
In the late 1980s, when Japan’s real estate and stock markets were constantly reaching
new highs, the global consensus was that Japan would soon be “eating America’s lunch.”
Then, in 1990, the Japanese real estate and stock markets crashed.
Initially, the government responded to the crisis by lowering interest rates to
revive the Japanese economy. When this did not yield the desired results, the government
attempted to stimulate the economy through massive infrastructure investments, bank
bailouts, and similar measures. These programs contributed to several years of outsized
budget deficits.
As in the US, only a small fraction of the bailout funds were used for potentially
productive investments into useful infrastructure, education, fundamental research
and other areas that can improve the competitive position of a country's economy.
Instead a significant portion went towares building infrastructure that nobody needed,
the so-called “roads to nowhere.”
The Japanese bank bailouts in the 1990s, like their US counterparts, amounted to
passing on the cost of past mistakes to tax payers. Some of these bailouts may have
been necessary, but they are unlikely to be profitable investments.
The government’s response to the financial crisis inflated the national debt from
65% of GDP in 1992 to 180% in 2005. The Debt to GDP ratio has held steady near these
levels since then.
Currently, Japan spends about 24% of their annual budget on interest payments. Any
significant increase in interest rates would push this expense into crippling territory,
but so far rates have shown little inclination to rise.
A decade of long-term interest rates in the low single digits should lead to inflation,
but in Japan inflation has been very tame. We can understand why this is the case
by looking at how money flows through the Japanese economy.
The first major difference between the US and Japan is that the savings rate in
Japan is very high and many Japanese invest their savings into government debt.
Ninety-three percent of the Japanese national debt is held internally. This would
be unthinkable in the US because consumers are themselves over-leveraged and can’t
lend much to their government.
Japanese banks tend to use deposits to buy government bonds rather than lending
them out to consumers. Presumably this reflects a reluctance of individuals and
businesses to borrow, and a reluctance of banks to lend to any but the most credit-worthy
borrowers.
In effect, the Japanese population lends its savings to the government, either directly
or by keeping its savings in a bank, which uses the deposits to buy bonds. Interest
payments are usually reinvested back into government bonds.
This process creates significant demand for Japanese government debt, which keeps
bond prices high and interest rates low. It also prevents inflation, because a lot
of bank deposits are used to fund the budget deficit rather than consumer and business
spending, which could drive up prices.
This unusual arrangement enabled Japan to sustain an inherently unstable situation
for the last decade. If the Japanese population decides to spend money instead of
saving it, or the banks decide to look for higher returns by lending to individuals
and businesses, inflation and interest rates will rise and Japan will have to address
its debt burden.
United Kingdom
Another example of an over-leveraged country was the United Kingdom after World
War II. The cost of World War I had left the country heavily in debt, and World
War II required the British to borrow even more to finance their defense.
An attack by a foreign power is surely one of the most compelling reasons for a
government to run a budget deficit. Nevertheless, war spending is similar to the
US and Japanese bailout programs in that it was unlikely to generate a return on
investment that is sufficient to repay the incurred national debt. Because of this
similarity, the post-war UK can shed light on what may be in store for the US.
By 1950, the UK had a Debt to GDP ratio of 250%, up from about 125% before WWII.
About half of the run-up in debt occurred during the war and mostly reflects war
spending. The other half includes rebuilding loans denominated in dollars that the
UK obtained from the US and Canada in 1945. These loans amounted to about 30% of
GDP in 1945. This portion of the national debt was used for infrastructure investments
that helped restart the peace-time UK economy. Presumably these investments did
generate sufficient revenues to pay back the loans.
Over the next forty years, the UK lowered its Debt to GDP ratio to 35%. Most of
this decline is due to an average annual GDP growth of 9.4%. About 7% of this growth
rate can be attributed to inflation. By 1990, inflation shrank the original debt
of 250% of GDP to 5.8%. (We assume that none of the principal was paid back and
ignore the exchange rate between the British Pound and the dollar, which is immaterial
compared to inflation.)
While inflating away debt has worked for the UK, it has not been a smooth ride.
Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, the government was struggling to keep inflation
from getting out of control while not completely choking off economic activity.
The resulting high unemployment caused social tensions and enabled unions to gain
power. Frequent strikes and labor unrest further harmed the local economy and limited
the ability of businesses to compete internationally. The UK economy lagged far
behind those of most other European countries during those years because of the
economic turmoil that ultimately stemmed from the need to inflate away an unmanageable
debt load.
Conclusion
Both Japan and the US took out loans for projects that were intended to restart
their respective economies, but which had little hope of generating enough tax revenue
to pay off the debt. The UK, on the other hand, was forced to spend on self-defense
during World War II and reconstruction after the war’s conclusion. Nevertheless,
all three countries found themselves significantly in debt with dim prospects for
paying it off.
The economic similarity between the US and UK suggests that the US will emulate
the UK’s strategy of inflating away the national debt. It seems unlikely that the
US will follow in Japan’s path. Japan’s ability to remain in a state of suspended
animation for over a decade is partly due to high savings rates and a slow flow
of money. In the US, banks, businesses, or individuals would eventually end the
suspended animation by taking on more risk in exchange for yields higher than the
2.5% currently available in the Japanese government bond market.
If the US follows the same trajectory as the UK did after World War II, we should
expect the next 20 to 30 years to bring some of the same difficulties that plagued
the UK in the decades after the war. However, one important difference between the
aftermath of WWII and the current situation is that there is no pent-up demand from
rebuilding Europe to stimulate economic activities. Consequently, we expect that
the UK's economy in the years following its post-war reconstruction, rather than
in the years immediately following World War II, will be a more indicative predictor
for the United States's present economic outlook.
Specifically, we should expect inflation significantly above historical averages.
This helps devalue the outstanding debt in real terms as long as new deficit spending
remains under control. The UK inflation rate of about 7% reduced the debt outstanding
in 1950 to 1/16th of its original value by 1990. This is an example of inflation
reducing a formerly unmanageable amount of debt to a sum that could be paid off
fairly comfortably.
Inflation is very good for debtors, but it can destabilize the economy and it is
hard on individuals. Normally, it hits lower-income brackets hardest, because wages
tend to change more slowly than prices rise. For low-income families, this can make
paying the bills difficult until wages adjust. Perhaps this is the reason why inflationary
periods tend to coincide with periods of social unrest, such as the labor unrest
in the UK during the 1960s and 1970s. As we work our way out from under our still
rapidly expanding national debt, it is likely that inflation will squeeze low-income
families, as well as retirees with fixed incomes that do not adjust for inflation.
The US government will have to return to some semblance of fiscal responsibility.
If this fails to happen because government officials decide it is good for the country,
it will happen because borrowing costs jump when inflation sets in. During the 1970s,
30-year UK government debt yielded around 14% per year compared to just 4% currently.
Running large deficits becomes impossibly expensive when interest rates are this
high.
In order to pay back existing debt, reduce the budget deficit, and meet the ever
expanding list of obligations, the US government will have to raise taxes. In the
UK and the US, the top income tax rates until the late 1970s were well in excess
of 80%. It is highly likely that tax rates across the board will rise dramatically
from the current historically low levels.
Governments have more financial tools at their disposal than individuals do, but
even with this expanded toolbox there is no painless way to excape from too much
debt. The most useful tool is the ability to print money, which causes inflation
and reduces the effective debt load without having to pay back a single penny. The
current Debt to GDP ratio of the US is alarmingly high and it is expected to get
much worse in the near future. Nevertheless, by printing money, returning to fiscal
responsibility and drastically raising taxes, the US should be able return to a
sustainable situation.
(c) 2009 Pivot Point Advisors, LLC.
All rights reserved. The material may not be re-published or re-used except with
prior written permission.